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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

J. STANLEY FRY and BEVERLY
FRY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
-vs-

DUCE SPORTING GOODS, INC., a
Utah corporation,

Case No. 14095

Defendant/Respondent and
Third Party Plaintiff,
-vsSTARFIRE INDUSTRIES, INC., a
Utah corporation, and HARDIN MARINE,
Third Party Defendants.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiffs/Appellants J. Stanley F r y
and Beverly F r y against the Defendant/Respondent Duce Sporting Goods,
Inc. for rescission of a contract to purchase a power boat and for damages
as a result of breaches of express and implied warranties. A Counterclaim
was filed by Duce against the Plaintiffs for the unpaid balance on the
contract.
A Third Party Complaint was filed by Defendant/Respondent

and Third Party Plaintiff Duce Sporting Goods, Inc. against Third Party
Defendants Starfire Industries, Inc. who manufactured the boat and Hardin
Marine who supplied some of the component parts, claiming damages for
breach of express and implied warranties.
The parties will be referred to herein as they appear in the
lower court.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before Judge Bryant H. Croft, sitting

*
m

without a jury, on the 21st and 24th days of June, 1974 and at the completion
i

of the Plaintiffs1 case, the Motion to Dismiss of the Defendant Duce Sporting
Goods, Inc. was granted by the Court.

Thereafter, a Judgment was

. ,

«•
m

entered in favor of the Defendant Duce Sporting Goods, Inc. and against the
Plaintiffs J. Stanley Fry and Beverly Fry for the unpaid balance on the contract^
for the purchase of the power boat.

•

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiffs seek to have the Order dismissing their
Complaint and the Judgment against them for the balance due on the contract

'm
«

set aside and further seek a Judgment in their favor and against the
m

Defendant rescinding the contract and for consequential damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

m

•
«

The Plaintiff J. Stanley Fry and his wife Beverly Fry are
avid water skiers, having been engaged in this sport for approximately
25 and 15 years, respectively-

(R. 174, 175, 396) For several years prior

m
m
m

m

to 1972 they had owned a 19 foot Higgins inboard power boat which was used

for water skiing and general pleasure boating.

(R. 176)

The Higgins boat owned by Mr. and Mrs., F r y would travel
at approximately 45 mph and would accelerate rapidly and pull two adult
water skiers with a load of five to six people in the boat without difficulty.
(R. 176, 332, 355, 397)
At the outset it should be noted that one of the requirements
for a power boat which is used to pull water skiers is that it be able to
accelerate rapidly in order to pull the water skiers out of the water and
have them plane on the surface of the water.

(R. 282, 316, 137, 355, 358,

385)
Mr. and M r s . F r y were acquainted with one F e r r a i Holding,
a salesman for the Defendant Duce Sporting Goods, I n c . , hereinafter
referred to as Duce, and he had ridden in the Higgins boat owned by the
F r y s and had observed its performance.

(R. 190, 245) The F r y s were

desirous of obtaining a power boat with the same or better performance <
characteristics as the Higgins boat and with the additional comforts such
as a deeper hull and sleeping quarters.

(R. 177, 183) Mr. Fry shopped

at several boat dealers and found nothing in stock which he felt would
meet his requirements.

(R. 184)

Mr. Fry informed Holding, the salesman for Duce, of his
desire to purchase a new boat and they inspected the power boats which
were in stock at Duce and found nothing of the type which the Frys wished
to purchase. As a result of this, Mr. F r y was taken by Holding to the
place of business of the Third Party Defendant Starfire Industries, Inc.,
-3-

hereinafter referred to as Starfire.
manufacturing boats.

Starfire is in the business of

(R. 185) There was some discussion about the

purchase of a Starfire boat with twin engines, however, this was
unacceptable to Mr. F r y .

(R. 181) The representatives of Starfire sug-

gested to Mr. F r y and Holding that he purchase a 22 foot Starfire hull
and power the same with a 455 cubic inch Oldsmobile engine coupled with
a Jacuzzi jet pump. (R. 186) F r y was not familiar with the Oldsmobile
engine but was familiar with a 454 cubic inch Chevrolet engine which a
friend of his had in a jet pump boat and inquired if this could be used in
lieu of the Oldsmobile engine.

The representatives of Starfire told him

they had conferred with the Third Party Defendant Hardin Marine, hereinafter referred to a s Hardin, concerning the engine and jet pump and that the
same would work satisfactorily.

(R. 187, 188) Hardin is engaged in the

business of adapting engines to jet pumps for power boats.

(R. 412)

After the representation had been made to Mr. F r y by
Starfire that the Chevrolet engine, Jacuzzi jet pump and 22 foot Starfire
were compatible, which representation was made in the presence of
Holding, he made a down payment to Duce and requested that they o r d e r
the boat. On August 29, 1972 a Retail Installment Contract was entered
into between the F r y s and Duce for the purchase of the assembled boat
for a total cash purchase price in the sum of $10,114. 55 and a deferred
payment price of $13,425.35. (R. 188)
The assembled boat was delivered to Duce by Starfire with
the engine and jet pump assembled.

Thereafter it was tested by Duce in

their shop tank and Mr. F r y was advised by Duce that it performed s a t i s factorily.

(R. 190) The boat was then delivered to the Plaintiffs a few days

prior to the Labor Day weekend of 1972. At this time Mr. and M r s . F r y ,
several friends, including Holding, took the boat to Utah Lake for a test
drive and when the throttle was opened up, the engine r p m ' s accelerated
rapidly, however, the boat vibrated and sank back into the water. (Rl 191)
The boat was tried again after most of the passengers had gotten out of the
same and the same problem ensued.

The Plaintiffs were advised by Holding

that the boat was cavitating which is caused by air, as opposed to water,
going into the Jacuzzi jet pump which results in a loss of thrust or propulsion, even though the engine r p m ' s a r e high. Holding informed Mr. and
M r s . Fry that the boat probably only needed some minor adjustment.
(R. 192, 193)
Thereafter, the boat was taken to Bear Lake by the F r y s and
used during the Labor Day weekend and was then stored for the winter.
When the boating season arrived in the late spring and early summer of
1973, Mr. F r y returned the boat to Duce at their request on approximately
six occasions for adjustments and modifications in an attempt to remedy
the defect.

(R. 195, 209, 219, 400)
The boat was used during the boating season of 1973, however,

it was virtually without use as a water ski boat. According to the testimony
of the Plaintiffs J. Stanley F r y and Beverly F r y , as well as Dick Williams,
John Reimer, Louis C. Lorenze and Homer Miller, who are all avid water
skiers and familiar with other propeller driven and jet pump powered boats,
-5-

the Starflre boat is unacceptable for this purpose.

(R. 212, 213, 282, 310,

316, 317, 333, 337, 348, 358, 360, 387, 388, 399) Mr. Reimer indicated
it took from 20 to 25 seconds for the Starfire boat to pull up a water skier
and that this was contrasted with a maximum of five seconds for all other
m

water ski boats with which he was familiar.

Because of the slow a e c e l e r a -

i
g

tion, the water skier is dragged through the water for what was described
as several blocks and the skiers often times a r e unable to get out of the
water and plane on the surface.

g

(R. 334-336)

•
n

According to the testimony of Barry Lieberman of Hardin,
•

.

the cavitation and the failure of the boat to accelerate properly is caused

i

i

by the incompatibility of the engine in question with the jet pump which was

«
i

utilized and that this combination is not recommended by them or the manu:

facturers of the Jacuzzi jet pump.

(R. 416r418, 435, 438)

i

•

In summary, the boat is completely unacceptable for the purpose *!
i

for which it was purchased by the Plaintiffs, which purpose was known by
i

Duce at the time the contract was entered into*

i

ARGUMENT

i
i

POINT I
_

.

f

THE EVIDENCE MUST BE REVIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE

•

TO PLAINTIFFS' THEORY OF THE CASE.

1
I

As was noted above, the Motion to Dismiss by the Defendait
!

Duce was granted at the completion of the presentation of the Plaintiffs

1

•

case.

•

!

(R. 115-117)

.

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah h a s , on numerous
-6-

<
i

occasions, held that if a dismissal or a non-suit is granted, the evidence
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the position of the party
against whom the motion was granted. In this regard, the Court in the
case of Caldwell v. Anschutz Drilling C o . , 13 Utah 2d 177, 369 P . 2d 964,
stated as follows:
11

.. .After the presentation of the plaintiffs 1
evidence, the trial court granted defendants'
motion to dismiss, from which plaintiffs
appeal. Under those circumstances, we
consider the evidence and every reasonable
inference that may be derived therefrom in
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs 1
u
theory of their case,
F o r other cases reiterating this fundamental principle of law,
see Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Co., 24 Utah 2d 128, 467 P . 2d 45;
Ewan v. Butters, 16 Utah 2d 272, 399 P . 2d 210; Wilkerson v. Stevens,
16 Utah 2d 424, 403 P . 2d 31 and Newton v. State Road Commission, 23 Utah
2d 350, 463 P . 2d 565.
POINT II
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE A VALID CLAIM AGAINST DUCE FOR BREACH
O F EXPRESS WARRANTIES.
It is the contention of the Plaintiffs that Defendant Duce
made express warranties to them concerning the boat in question and that
the same were breached.

In this regard Section 70A-2-313, Utah Code

Annotated, provides in part as follows:
"Express warranties by affirmation, promise,
description, sample. - (1) Express warranties
by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise
-7-

made by the seller to the buyer which r e l a t e s to
the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the
goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise.

"(2) It is not necessary to the creation of
an express warranty that the seller use formal
words such as 'warrant 1 or ! guarantee ! o r that
he have a specific intention to make a w a r r a n t y , . . . t f
There is no question but that Duce sold the power boat in
question to the Plaintiffs and, therefore, is a "seller 11 within the meaning
of the foregoing statutes. And, as was noted in the Statement of F a c t s ,
F e r r a l Holding, the salesman for Duce who handled the transaction with
the Plaintiffs, was aware of the requirements which Plaintiffs needed in the
boat which they intended to purchase.
Plaintiffs concede that at the time the contract was entered
into the representations which were made to them that the Chevrolet engine
and the Jacuzzi jet pump were compatible and would result in a high p e r formance water ski and pleasure power boat, were made by Starfire.
However, it is important to note that it was the representatives of Duce
who took the Plaintiffs to Starfire with the intent of selling them a boat to
be manufactured by the latter and that the representatives of Duce were
present when the representations were made.
It is the position of the Plaintiffs that Duce becomes bound
by the representations made by its supplier Starfire directly to the
Plaintiffs once it entered into the contract for the sale of the property.

To

hold otherwise would allow a seller who has profited from the sale to
escape any liability for failure of merchandise sold by him to conform to
representations made concerning it which he knew were the basis for the
transaction being entered into.
F o r a case with a factual situation similar to the instant
case which holds the seller liable for representations made by its supplier,
see Carver v. Denn, 117 Utah 180, 214 P. 2d 118. In that case the buyer had
negotiated for the purchase of air conditioning equipment for his store with
one Maycock prior to entering into a contract for the furnishing of the same
with the seller.

The seller apparently knew of the representations of his

supplier, Maycock, and in holding that he was responsible for the same, the
Court stated as follows:
"Plaintiff [seller] lastly seeks to be relieved of
liability for breach of warranty by claiming that
defendant did not rely on his skill or judgment
since he did not enter into the negotiations until
after the type of cooler had been agreed upon.
The primary negotiations for the installation of
this cooler were between George Maycock and the
defendant [buyer] but the contract for the sale and
installation was not agreed upon between them. . . .
Plaintiff might have elected to submit his bid to
Maycock or to bid only on the installation and let
Maycock submit a separate bid, but he elected to
go further than this. He elected to become the
seller of the machine and in so doing he adopted
Maycock as his representative for the sale.
He knew that Maycock had been negotiating with
defendant for the installation of a cooling system
and agreed to join with Maycock in the venture.
His primary responsibility under the contract was
to install a satisfactory air conditioning system
which required satisfactory equipment and proper
installation. He was aware of the fact that defendant was unfamiliar with conditioning installations
-9-

and must accept the skill and judgment of the
parties participating in the sale and installations. Plaintiff was willing to enter into some
kind of arrangement with Maycocks so that he
could become the seller. . . . Plaintiff, having
elected to take the benefits of Maycock r s sales
activities and knowing that defendant must rely
on both for a satisfactory installation, is
charged with the responsibility of furnishing an
installation which must be reasonably fit for the
purpose intended.' • [Emphasis added]
In the instant case the evidence is clearly to the effect that
based upon the representations of Starfire that the boat hull, engine and
jet pump were compatible and that the assembled boat would perform as
required by the Plaintiffs, the contract was entered into. Thus, the r e p r e sentations were the "basis of the bargain 11 and fall squarely within the
meaning of the foregoing statute.

J

As was noted in the Statement of F a c t s , there is a multitude
of evidence that the boat is seriously deficient as a water ski boat, which
was one of the primary purposes for which it was purchased, and this does
not appear to be seriously contested by Duce or any other party to the
action.

This constitutes a breach of the express warranties and gives r i s e

to a valid claim in the Plaintiffs.
POINT HI
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE A VALID CLAIM FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY.
Again, as was noted in the Statement of F a c t s , the evidence
affirmatively shows that the boat purchased by the Plaintiffs from Duce did
not perform in the manner of other power boats of similar size and h o r s e -10-

power which rendered the same unuseable as a water ski boat.
Section 70A-2-314, Utah Code Annotated, provides in
part as follows:
"Implied warranty - Merchantability - Usage
of trade. .- (1) Unless excluded or modified
(section 70A-2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract
for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind. . . .
"(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least
such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under
the contract description; and.
(c) a r e fit for the ordinary purpose for
which such goods are u s e d ; — !f
In order for the Plaintiffs to come within the scope of this
statute, the first requirement is that the seller be a "merchant with
respect to goods of that kind. ! ! It is not disputed that Duce is engaged in
the business of selling power boats and, in fact, sold the boat to the
Plaintiffs which is the subject matter of this lawsuit.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the trial court in granting the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss held that n Duce was not a merchant dealing
in boats of the kind here sold. " (R. 110) This was based upon the fact that
Duce had not sold a boat with this particular engine and jet pump installed
in it on any prior occasion and by way of analogy the Court stated a s follows:
11

.. .An automobile dealer who sells only
Volkswagens can hardly be said to be a
merchant with respect to a Lincoln Continental
equipped with a Cadillac motor which such
dealer might upon one occasion sell. f !
With all due respect to the trial Judge, he is incorrect in his
-11-

assessment of the law on this subject.

In commenting upon the issue in

question the editors in Anderson Uniform Commercial Code, 2nd Edition,
state as follows:
m

11

The limiting concept of being a merchant
!
with respect to goods of that kind1 is to be
liberally construed so as to embrace any
products that are sold within the general
category in which the defendait has been
dealing,

m

~

m

11

Consequently the implied warranty of
merchantability a r i s e s with respect to the
fitness of a hammer for ordinary purposes
where sold by a building materials supplier
who sold the particular manufacturer's
line of goods, even though he had not sold
this particular hammer before. ! ! (Citing
Mutual Services of Highland Park, Inc. v.
S, O. S. Plumbing & Sewerage C o . , 93 III.
App.2d 257, 235 N . E . 2 d 265) Vol. 1, p. 581

«
•
g

i
§

. i

The evidence readily establishes that Duce was engaged in the

M

sale of power boats and initiated steps to locate the component parts which

•
i

were assembled into the power boat which it ultimately sold to the Plaintiffs.
•.

i

It is also apparent that this type of sales transaction is common place for s a l e s j
of automobiles, motor boats, trucks, t r a c t o r s and other machinery where the •
i

retailer has at his disposal the wherewithal to order and obtain many different
i

combinations of body styles, colors, engines, transmissions, etc. for automobiles and various hulls, engines, drives, etc. for power boats and a like

M
f
i

composition for other types of machinery.

If the ruling of the trial court
i

were followed it would lead to the absurd conclusion that because the p a r t i -

i

cular automobile dealer, boat dealer or other seller had not sold an

!

automobile, boat, or other product of that specific makeup on a prior
i

-12-

<

occasion, he would have no liability if the product was defective.
The second requirement in order for Plaintiff to prevail on a
claim based upon breach of warranty of merchantability imposed by the
statute, is to show that the boat did not pass without objection in the trade
or that it was not fit for the ordinary purpose for which boats of this type
a r e used.

The evidence is clear and not seriously disputed by Duce that the

boat did not perform as expected by them and as required by the Plaintiffs
and as other boats of similar horse power and design would perform.

In

this regard, the testimony of Barry Lieberman of Hardin, which is a
company whose business is primarily adapting engines to jet drives for
power boats, is in part as follows:
,f

Q. With respect to the 454 Chevrolet engine
and the 12YJ Jacuzzi pump, do you have those
plans and specifications?
"A. No, s i r .
"Q. Why not?
"A. The engine is not recommended for that.
The pump is not recommended for that type of
horsepower.
U

Q. Why isn't the 12YJ recommended?

"A. The horsepower is too great for the
impeller at this point. . . .
•

*

*

n

Q. Do you know whether or not anything was
said or done with respect to the mating of the
454 Chevrolet with the 12YJ Jacuzzi pump?
11

A. As soon as we found out that engine was in
that boat with that pump, we recommended - -13-

again, you have two choices; either to change
the pump to a 12 WJ or change the motor back to
an acceptable motor that will not cavitate that
pump.

n

Q . Let me ask it in this way: You said the
manufacturer of Jacuzzi does not recommend
or does not specify the use of the Y-pump with the
454 horsepower engine, right?
"A.

Right.

!I

Q. And the problem described in the letter is
the reason why these two units a r e not by design
put together without some testing being made?
"A.

Right.

!!

Q. Did I understand correctly that jet propulsion
of boats is your particular specialty?

.x--

"A. Y e s . , ! (R. 417, 432, 436, 437, 438)
As can be clearly seen by the testimony of Mr. Lieberman
and of other witnesses concerning the performance of the boat, the same
fails to pass without objection in the trade and is not fit for the ordinary
purpose for which such a boat is normally used.
The contention is made by Duce that the Plaintiff J. Stanley
P r y was the person who specified the 454 Chevrolet engine. However, the
evidence is to the effect that the Plaintiff was familiar with this particular
type of engine and inquired of Duce and Starfire if the same would be
acceptable and was advised that it would be. However, even if the Court
concluded that the Plaintiff specified the engine and relied upon his own

-14-

judgment in this regard, such a finding would not preclude a recovery
based upon breach of warranty of merchantability.

In the Official Code

Comment to Section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the
following is noted:
" 3 . A specific designation of goods by the
buyer does not exclude the s e l l e r ' s obligation
that they be fit for the general purposes appropriate to such goods. 11
Nor is it a defense to the claim of breach of warranty of
merchantability that Duce did not assemble the component p a r t s , namely
the boat hull, Chevrolet engine and jet pump, but relied upon the workmanship and expertise of its sellers and suppliers. In this regard, Anderson
Uniform Commercial Code, Volume 1, 2d Edition, page 565 provides as
follows:
"The warranty liability of a manufacturer
under the Code is not affected by the fact that
the defect which constitutes the breach of
warranty was a defect in the component part
which the manufacturer had purchased from
another manufacturer and had merely incorporated in his own product.. • . "
A case which is somewhat analogous to the fact situation in the
instant case is Hunt v. Perkins Machinery Co., 352 Mass. 535, 226 N. E. 2d
228. In that case the Plaintiff, who was a boat owner, purchased a marine
engine from the Defendant who was engaged in that business and the evidence
indicated that the engine gave off excessive quantities of black smoke when
running and Defendant was unable to cure the defect after numerous attempts
to do so. Based upon this and the fact that the evidence indicated that
-15-

Plaintiff relied upon the Defendant in purchasing the type of engine in
question, the Court found there were breaches of both warranties of
merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose under Sections
2-314 and 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
In the case of Rudolph v. Huckman, 267 A. 2d 896, a new boat
purchased by the Plaintiff manifested numerous defects and became
inoperable after very limited use and the Court held that the evidence was
sufficient to establish that the defects existed at the time the goods were
delivered from the seller to the buyer.
The important concept of the statute in question is that it
imposes an implied warranty of merchantability upon a seller for the product
sold by him without regard to any affirmative representation which he may
or may not have made concerning the same.

Reliance or lack thereof of the

buyer on any representations made is not necessary,to recover.

Further,

any negligence on the part of the seller or any diligence or lack thereof
which he may or may not have exercised in connection with the sale of the
product is not relevant.

All that need be shown is that the seller is a

merchant with respect to goods of the kind sold and that the product is
defective as defined in the statute. It is amply clear from the evidence
in this matter that the boat was defective which has resulted in the damage
complained of by Plaintiffs.
POINT IV
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE A VALID CLAIM FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
-16-

It is the contention of the Plaintiffs that Duce breached an
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in connection with the
sale of the boat in question.

Section 70A-2-315, Utah Code Annotated,

provides as follows:
"Implied warranty - Fitness for particular
purpose. - Where the seller at the time of
contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and
that the buyer is relying on the seller f s skill
or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods,
there is unless excluded or modified under the
next section an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose."
In the instant case the evidence discloses that Duce, through its
agent, Holding, was familiar with the type of boat which Plaintiffs desired,
i . e . a high performance water skiing and pleasure boat. Also, Defendant
Duce was engaged in the business of selling power boats and after it became
apparent that they had nothing in stock which would satisfy the particular
needs of the Plaintiffs, they took it upon themselves to attempt to obtain
such a boat for them and it was at this point that the meeting with Starfire
took place.

The Plaintiffs relied upon the skill and judgment of Duce and

its suppliers, Starfire and Hardin, to furnish him with a high performance
water skiing boat.
In this instance, even though the boat moves forward and
remains afloat, it does not perform as had been required by the Plaintiffs
and, thus, it fails to fit the "particular purpose 11 for which it was required.
In this regard, the Official Code Comments provide as follows :
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v

A 'particular purpose 1 differs from the ordinary purpose for which goods a r e used in that
it envisions a specific use by the buyer which is
peculiar to the nature of its business whereas
the ordinary purpose for which goods a r e used
a r e those envisioned in the concept of merchantability and go to the uses which a r e customarily
made of the goods in question. F o r example,
shoes a r e generally used for the purpose of
walking upon ordinary ground, but a s e l l e r may
know that a particular pair was selected to be
used for climbing mountains.
11

A contract may, of course, include both a warranty
of merchantability and one of fitness for a p a r t i cular purpose. , ! [Emphasis added]
As was noted in the Statement of F a c t s , the Plaintiff J . Stanley
F r y suggested the particular engine used in this instance because he was
familiar with it, however, this was a m e r e suggestion on his part and he
relied upon the expertise of Duce and its supplier in making a determination
that the boat hull and jet pump were compatible with the engine which he
suggested.
In order for Duce to a s s e r t a defense on the grounds that the
Plaintiff requested a particular type of engine, it must be shown that he
furnished precise technical specifications and that the s e l l e r merely followed
these. In the case of Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo C o r p . ,
451 F.2d 1115, the United States Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit
affirmed a ruling by Judge A. Sherman Christensen of the United States
District Court for the District of Utah in favor of a buyer based on a breach
of a claim of warranty for a particular purpose. In addressing itself to the
proposition set forth above, the Court stated as follows:
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"Second, Alcoa argues that goods manufactured
to a buyer's specifications do not give rise to
an implied warranty of fitness. That doctrine,
however, applies only where the buyer furnishes
precise technical specifications. Compare
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Independent Metals
C o . , 203 F.2d 838, 844-845 (8th Cir. 1953) with
P e t e r s v. Lyons, Iowa, 168 N. W.2d 759 (1969).
See Uniform Commercial Code, Official Comment
n
2 to Section 2-315
[Emphasis added]
Other similar cases holding an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose to arise are Mack Trucks of Arkansas, Inc. v.
Jet Asphalt & Rock C o . , (Ark. 437 S. W.2d 459) where buyer ordered specific trucks after advising the seller of his needs for the same and Boing A i r plane Co. v. O'Malley (C.A. 8 Minn.) 329 F.2d 585 where the buyer
advised the seller of particular uses that were intended for the helicopter
which he purchased from the seller and the helicoptor would not perform
the tasks for which it was intended. One of the tasks intended for the helicoptor in the Boing case was to lift a certain amount of weight and the
helicoptor was incapable of doing this.
POINT V
THE CONTRACT SHOULD BE RESCINDED AND THE AMOUNT PAID ON
THE PURCHASE PRICE RETURNED TO THEM, TOGETHER WITH AN
AWARD OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.
It appears there is no question but that what the Plaintiffs
accepted the boat when it was delivered to them, however, this does not
preclude rescission of the contract if the product is defective and the seller
fails to remedy the defect.

In this regard, Section 70A-2-608, Utah Code
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Annotated, provides as follows:
l!

70A~2-608. Revocation of acceptance in
whole or in part. - (1) The buyer may revoke
his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit
whose nonconformity substantially impairs its
value to him if he has accepted it.
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its
nonconformity would be cured and it has not been
seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such nonconformity
if his acceptance was reasonably induced either
by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance
or by the s e l l e r ' s assurances.

m

•
m

«
«
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(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within
a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or
should have discovered the ground for it and
before any substantial change in condition of the
goods which is not caused by their own defects*
It is not effective until the buyer notifies the
seller of it.

i
§

•
B

i

"(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights
and duties with regard to the goods involved as if
he had rejected them. M

•
•

Duce assured Plaintiffs after the defect was first discovered

•

in the fall of 1972 that it was of a "minor nature 11 and would be corrected
with some "adjustments. 1 1 Thereafter the boat was returned by Plaintiffs
to Duce on approximately six occasions during the boating season of 1973
and notwithstanding this, the defect was not corrected.
Plaintiffs concede that the statute requires that notice of
revocation of acceptance must be given by the buyer to the s e l l e r .

However,

there is no requirement that this be in writing or that it be in any particular
form.

In the ins tant case the evidence shows that the Plaintiffs told Duce

they wanted the defects corrected or a refund of their purchase price.
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(R. 207, 237) The defect was not remedied, nor was the purchase price
returned and, thus, the lawsuit which prayed for a rescission of the contract
was filed on September 13, 1973. (R. 1)
With regard to the position of the Plaintiffs that no writing
or other particular form of notice of rescission is required, the editors
in Anderson Uniform Commercial Code, 2nd Edition, Vol. 2 at page 245,
provides in part as follows:
M

No particular form or content is specified
by the Code for revocation of a c c e p t a n c e . . . .
!l

Any conduct clearly manifesting a desire of
the buyer to get his money back is sufficient
notice to revoke. Thus, a refusal to permit
the seller to make r e p a i r s may be sufficient
manifestation by the buyer of intent to revoke
acceptance and cancel the contract. ? ! [Emphasis
added]
Once the buyer justifiably revokes the acceptance of the goods
he is entitled to a refund of the amount paid by him for the purchase price,
together with any provable consequential damages. In this regard,
Section 70A-2-711, Utah Code Annotated, provides in part as follows:
n

Buyer f s remedies in general - Buyer T s
security interest in rejected goods. - (1)
Where the seller fails to make delivery or
repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or
justifiably revokes acceptance then with
respect to any goods involved, and with respect
to the whole if the breach goes to the whole
contract (section 70A-2-612), the buyer may
cancel and whether or not he has done so may
in addition to recovering so much of the price
as has been paid
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n

(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable
revocation of acceptance a buyer has a security
interest in goods in his possession or control*
for any payments made on their price and any
expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care and custody
and may hold such goods and r e s e l l them in
like manner as an aggrieved seller (section
70A-2-706). , !
The position of the Plaintiffs that in addition to recovering the
amount paid by them for the purchase price, they a r e entitled to recover
any additional damages which they can prov^ is supported by the authorities.
Anderson Uniform Commercial Code, 2nd Edition, Vol. 2 at page 416 states
as follows:
11

Section 2-711-10. Money recovery by buyer
on cancellation. A buyer effectively cancelling
a sales contract is entitled to return of any money
paid by him and damages. The remedies of canceilation and damages a r e available concurrently
and not in the alternative. Thus, if a buyer has
made a trade in as part of the sales transaction
which is thereafter cancelled, the buyer is
entitled to recover, in addition to damages, the
part of the purchase price he has paid in money
and the value of the property given as a trade in. f l
[Emphasis added]

•
a

•
«
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The answer to the contention by Duce that the boat in question

i

has never been returned or tendered to them and thus there can be no
cancellation of the contract is clearly set forth by subparagraph three of
i

Section 70A-2-711, Utah Code Annotated, quoted above.

This statute gives

the buyer who has rejected defective goods a security interest in them and
the right to retain the same until the purchase price has been refunded.
CONCLUSION
The evidence which must be viewed in the light most favorable
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to Plaintiffs 1 theory of the case, clearly shows that the boat purchased
by the Plaintiffs from Duce is defective and fails to function as a water skr
boat which is the primary purpose for which it was purchased. It also
establishes that express representations were made by Starfire to Plaintiffs
concerning the compatibility of the boat hull, engine and jet drive in question
which were made in the presence of Duce prior to the time the contract was
entered into and constituted f! the basis of the bargain! 1
The evidence also clearly establishes that Duce was engaged
in the selling of power boats and, in fact, sold the boat in question to the
Plaintiffs and therefore it is a "merchant with respect to goods of that kind"
and is bound by the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.
As a result of the breach of the express warranties and the
implied warranties of merchantability and of fitness for the particular
purpose for which the boat was purchased, the Plaintiffs a r e entitled to
rescission of the contract and a refund of the amount of the purchase price
paid by them, together with any consequential damages which they have
incurred.
Respectfully submitted,
Carman E. Kipp and
J . Anthony Eyre
Kipp and Christian
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to
Dean E. Conder, Attorney for Defendant/Respondent Duce, 410 Newhouse
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Attorney for
Third Party Defendant Starfire, 430 Judge Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

n
»

84111; and to W. Brent Wilcox, Attorney for Third Party Defendant Hardin,

"

Deseret Plaza Building, Salt Liake City, Utah 84111, this 21st day of
November, 1975.

•

Secretary
i
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